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Abstract
It is widely accepted that consciousness or, more generally, mental activity is in
some way correlated to the behavior of the material brain. Since quantum theory
is the most fundamental theory of matter that is currently available, it is a legiti-
mate question to ask whether quantum theory can help us to understand conscious-
ness. Several approaches answering this question affirmatively, proposed in recent
decades, will be surveyed. It will be pointed out that they make different epis-
temological assumptions, refer to different neurophysiological levels of description,
and use quantum theory in different ways. For each of the approaches discussed,
problematic and promising features will be equally highlighted.
1 Introduction
The problem of how mind and matter are related to each other has many facets, and
it can be approached from many different starting points. Of course, the historically
leading disciplines in this respect are philosophy and psychology, which were later joined
by behavioral science, cognitive science and neuroscience. In addition, the physics of
complex systems and quantum physics have played stimulating roles in the discussion
from their beginnings.
As regards the issue of complexity, this is quite evident: the brain is one of the most
complex systems we know. The study of neural networks, their relation to the operation
of single neurons and other important topics do and will profit a lot from complex systems
approaches. As regards quantum physics, the situation is different. Although there can be
no reasonable doubt that quantum events occur in the brain as elsewhere in the material
world, it is the subject of controversy whether these events are in any way efficacious and
relevant for those aspects of brain activity that are correlated with mental activity.
The original motivation in the early 20th century for relating quantum theory to con-
sciousness was essentially philosophical. It is fairly plausible that conscious free decisions
(free will”) are problematic in a perfectly deterministic world,1 so quantum randomness
might indeed open up novel possibilities for free will. (On the other hand, randomness is
problematic for volition!)
lThis statement reflects a philosophical position which is known as incompatibilism. It is more or less
implicitly shared by most scientists thinking about the options quantum theory offers for free will. On
a compatibilist presumption, free will does not necessarily contradict determinism. For more details see
the volume by Kane (1996), who invokes indeterministic quantum events in his own account of free will.
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Quantum theory introduced an element of randomness standing out against the previ-
ous deterministic worldview, in which randomness, if it occurred at all, simply indicated
our ignorance of a more detailed description (as in statistical physics). In sharp contrast
to such epistemic randomness, quantum randomness in processes such as spontaneous
emission of light, radioactive decay, or other examples of state reduction was considered a
fundamental feature of nature, independent of our ignorance or knowledge. To be precise,
this feature refers to individual quantum events, whereas the behavior of ensembles of
such events is statistically determined. The indeterminism of individual quantum events
is constrained by statistical laws.
Other features of quantum theory, which were found attractive in discussing issues
of consciousness, were the concepts of complementarity and entanglement. Pioneers of
quantum physics such as Planck, Bohr, Schr\"odinger, Pauli (and others) emphasized the
various possible roles of quantum theory in reconsidering the old conflict between physical
determinism and conscious free will. For informative overviews see e.g., Squires 1990 and
Butterfield 1998.
In this contribution, some popular approaches for applying quantum theory to con-
sciousness will be surveyed and compared. Section 2 outlines two fundamentally different
philosophical options for conceiving of relations between material and mental states of
systems. Section 3 addresses three different neurophysiological levels of description, to
which particular different quantum approaches refer. After some introductory remarks,
Section 4 sketches the individual approaches themselves Section 4.2: Stapp, Section
4.3: from Umezawa to Vitiello, Section 4.4: Beck and Eccles, Section 4.5: Penrose and
Hameroff, and Section 4.6: “dual-aspect” approaches such as have been tentatively pro-
posed by Pauli and Jung as well as Bohm and Hiley. Section 5 offers some comparative
conclusions.
2 Philosophical Background Assumptions
Variants of the dichotomy between mind and matter range from their fundamental dis-
tinction at a primordial level of description to the emergence of mind (consciousness) $hom$
the brain as an extremely sophisticated and highly developed material system. Informa-
tive overviews can be found in Popper and Eccles (1977), Chalmers (1996), and Pauen
(2001).
One important aspect of all discussions about the relation between mind and matter is
the distinction between descriptive and explanatory approaches. For instance, comlation
is a descriptive term with empirical relevance, while causation is an explanatory term
associated with theoretical attempts to understand correlations. Causation implies cor-
relations between cause and effect, but this does not always apply the other way around:
correlations between two systems can result from a common cause in their history rather
than from a direct causal interaction.
In the fundamental sciences, one typically speaks of causal relations in terms of inter-
actions. In physics, for instance, there are four fundamental kinds of interactions (elec-
tromagnetic, weak, strong, gravitational) which serve to explain the correlations that are
observed in physical systems. As regards the mind-matter problem, the situation is more
difficult. Far from a theoretical understanding in this field, the existing body of knowledge
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essentially consists of empirical correlations between material and mental states. These
correlations are descriptive, not explanatory; they are not causally conditioned. It is (for
some purposes) interesting to know that particular brain areas are activated during partic-
ular mental activities; but this does, of course, not explain why they are. Thus, it would
be premature to talk about mind-matter interactions in the sense of causal relations. For
the sake of terminological clarity, the neutral notion of relations between mind and matter
will be used in this article.
In most approaches used to discuss relations between material [ma] brain states and
mental [me] states of consciousness, these relations are conceived in a direct way (A):
$[ma]arrowarrow[me]$
This provides a minimal framework to study reduction, supervenience, or emergence re-
lations (Kim 1998, Stephan 1999) which can yield both monistic and dualistic pictures.
For instance, there is the classical stance of strong reduction, claiming that all mental
states and properties can be reduced to the material domain (materialism) or even to
physics (physicalism).2 This point of view claims that it is both necessary and sufficient
to explore and understand the material domain, e.g., the brain, in order to understand
the mental domain, e.g., cognition. More or less, this leads to a monistic picture, in which
any need to discuss mental states is eliminated right away or at least considered as epiphe-
nomenal. While mind-brain correlations are still legitimate though causally inefficacious
from an epiphenomenalist point of view, eliminative materialism renders even correlations
irrelevant.
The most discussed counterarguments against the validity of such strong reduction-
ist approaches are qualia arguments, which emphasize the impossibility for materialist
accounts to properly incorporate the quality of the subjective experience of a mental
state, the “what it is like” (Nagel 1974) to be in that state. This leads to a gap between
third-person and first-person accounts for which Chalmers (1995) has coined the notion
of the “hard problem of consciousness”. Another, less well known counterargument is
that the physical domain itself is not causally closed. Any experiment, even in classical
physics, requires to fix boundary conditions and initial conditions which are not given
by the fundamental laws of nature (Primas 2002). Of course, this causal gap becomes
even more challenging in quantum physics, as indicated in the introduction. A third class
of counterarguments refer to the difficulties to include notions of temporal present and
nowness in a physical description (Ranck 2004).
However, direct relations between mental and material states can also be conceived
in a non-reductionistic fashion. A number of variants of emergence (Stephan 1999) are
prominent examples. Mental states and/or properties can be considered as emergent if
the material brain is not necessary or not sufficient to explore and understand them.3
This leads to a dualistic picture (less radical and more plausible than Cartesian dualism)
in which residua remain if one attempts to reduce the mental to the material. Within
2Although materialism and physicalism are often used interchangeably, it is useful to distinguish them
if one does not wish to commit oneself to the assumption that neurobiology is completely reducible to
fundamental physics. For this reason, I will refer to the material rather than the physical throughout
this article.
3See Bishop and Atmanspacher (2006) and Atmanspacher and beim Graben (2006) for a more detailed
discussion of physical examples of contextual conditions in the description of emergent properties.
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a dualistic scheme of thinking, it becomes almost inevitable to discuss the question of
causal influence between mental and material states. In particular, the causal efficacy of
mental states upon brain states $(^{\zeta(}downward$ causation”) has recently attracted growing
interest (Velmans 2002).4
As an altemative to (A), it is possible to conceive mind-matter relations indirectly




This third category, here denoted [mame], is often regarded as being neutral with re-
spect to the distinction between [ma] and [me], i.e., psychophysically neutral. In scenario
(B), issues of reduction and emergence concem the relation between the unseparated
“background reality” [mame] and the distinguished aspects [ma] and [me]. This will be
discussed in more detail in Section 4.6.
Such a “dual-aspect” option, although not much emphasized in contemporary main-
stream discussions, has a long tradition. Early versions go back as far as Spinoza and
Leibniz. In the early days of psychophysics in the 19th century, Fechner (1861) and Wundt
(1911) advocated related views. Whitehead, the modern pioneer of process philosophy,
referred to mental and physical poles of “actual occasions”, which themselves transcend
their bipolar appearances (Whitehead 1978). Many approaches in the tradition of Feigl
(1967) and Smart (1963), called “identity theories”, conceive mental and material states
as essentially identical “central states“, yet considered from different perspectives. Other
variants of this idea have been suggested by Jung and Pauli (1955),5 involving Jung’s
conception of a psychophysically neutral, archetypal order, or by Bohm and Hiley (Bohm
1990, Bohm and Hiley 1993, Hiley 2001), referring to an implicate order which unfolds
into the different explicate domains of the mental and the material.
From a psychological perspective, Velmans (2002) has recently presented a similar ap-
proach, backed up with empirical material, and Strawson (2003) has proposed a “real
materialism” which uses a closely related scheme. Another proponent of such dual-
aspect thinking is Chalmers (1996), who considers the possibility that the underlying,
psychophysically neutral level of description could be best characterized in terms of in-
formation.
Before proceeding further, it should be emphasized that many present-day approaches
prefer to distinguish between first-person and third-person perspectives rather than men-
tal and material states. This terminology serves to highlight the discrepancy between
immediate conscious experiences (qualia) and their description, be it behavioral, neural,
or biophysical. The notion of the “hard problem” of consciousness research refers to bridg-
ing the gap between first-person experience and third-person accounts of it. In the present
contribution, mental conscious states are implicitly assumed to be related to first-person
4A less controversial notion in addressing this issue could be in terms of constraints that mental state
impose on brain states.
5See also Meier $($2001 $)$ and Atmanspacher and Primas (1996, 2006).
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experience. This does not mean, however, that the problem of how to define consciousness
precisely is considered as resolved. Ultimately, it will be (at least) as difficult to define a
mental state in rigorous terms as it is to define a material state.
3 Neurophysiological Levels of Description
3.1 Neuronal Assemblies
A mental system can be in many different conscious, intentional mental states. In a
hypothetical state space, a sequence of such states forms a trajectory representing what
is often called the stream of consciousness. Since different subsets of the state space are
typically associated with different stability properties, a uiental state can be assunied to
be more or less stable, depending on its position in the state space. Stable states are
distinguished by a residence time longer than that of metastable or unstable states. If a
mental state is stable with respect to perturbations, it “activates” a mental representation
encoding a content that is consciously perceived.
Moving from this psychological, or cognitive, description to its neurophysiological
counterpart leads us to the question: What is the neural correlate of a mental repre-
sentation? According to standard accounts (cf. Noe and Thompson (2004) for recent
discussion), mental representations are correlated with the activity of neuronal assem-
blies, i.e., ensembles of several thousands of coupled neurons. The neural correlate of a
mental representation can be characterized by the fact that the connectivities, or cou-
plings, among those neurons form an assembly confined with respect to its environment,
to which connectivities are weaker than within the assembly. The neural correlate of
a mental representation is activated if the neurons forming the assembly operate more
actively, e.g., produce higher firing rates, than in their default mode.
Figure 1: Neuronal feedback assembly with excitatory (”erregende”) and inhibitory
connections (“hemmende Verbindungen”).
In order to achieve a stable operation of an activated neuronal assembly, there must be
a subtle balance between inhibitory and excitatory connections among neurons (cf. Figure
1 $)$ . If the transfer function of individual neurons is strictly monotonic, i.e., increasing
input leads to increasing output, assemblies are difficult to stabilize. For this reason,
recent results establishing a non-monotonic transfer function with a maximal output at
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intermediate input are of high significance for the modeling of neuronal assemblies Kuhn
et al. (2004). For instance, network models using lattices of coupled maps with quadratic
maximum (Kaneko and Tsuda 2000) are paradigmatic examples of such behavior. These
and other familiar models of neuronal assemblies (for an overview, see Anderson and
Rosenfeld 1988) are mostly formulated in a way not invoking well-defined elements of
quantum theory. An explicit exception is the approach by Umezawa, Vitiello and others
(see Section 4.3).
3.2 Single Neurons and Synapses
The fact that neuronal assemblies are mostly described in terms of classical behavior
does not rule out that classically undescribable quantum effects may be significant if one
focuses on individual constituents of assemblies, i.e., single neurons or interfaces between
them. These interfaces, through which the signals between neurons propagate, are called
synapses. There are electrical and chemical synapses, depending on whether they transmit
a signal electrically or chemically.
At electrical synapses, the current generated by the action potential at the presynap-
tic neuron flows directly into the postsynaptic cell, which is physically connected to the
presynaptic terminal by a so-called gap junction. At chemical synapses, there is a cleft
between pre and postsynaptic cell. In order to propagate a signal, a chemical transmitter
(glutamate) is released at the presynaptic terminal. This release process is called exo-
cytosis. The transmitter diffuses across the synaptic cleft and binds to receptors at the
postsynaptic membrane, thus opening an ion channel (Kandel et al. 2000, part III; see
Fig. 2 $)$ . Chemical transmission is slower than electric transmission.
Figure 2: Release of neurotransmitters at the synaptic cleft (exocytosis).
A model developed by Beck and Eccles applies concrete quantum mechanical features
to describe details of the process of exocytosis. Their model proposes that quantum
processes are relevant for exocytosis and, moreover, are tightly related to states of con-
sciousness. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.4.
At this point, another approach developed by Flohr (2000) should be mentioned, for
which chemlcal synapses with a specific type of receptors, so-called NMDA receptors,6 are
of paramount significance. Briefly, Flohr observes that the specific plasticity of NMDA
receptors is a necessary condition for the formation of extended stable neuronal assemblies
correlated to (higher-order) mental representations which he identifies with conscious
6The abbreviation NMDA refers to N-methyl-D-aspartate, the synthetic agonist that activates NMDA
receptors.
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states. Moreover, he indicates a number of mechariisms caused by anaesthetic agents,
which block NMDA receptors and consequently lead to a loss of consciousness. Flohr’s
approach is physicalistic and reductionistic, but it is entirely independent of any specific
quantum ideas.
3.3 Microtubuli
The lowest neurophysiological level, at which quantum processes have been proposed
as a correlate to consciousness, is the level at which the interior of single neurons is
considered: their cytoskeleton. It consists of protein networks essentially made up of two
kinds of structures, neurofilaments and microtubuli (Fig. 3, left), which are essential for
various transport processes within neurons (as well as other cells). Microtubuli are long
polymers usually constructed of 13 longitudinal $\alpha-$ and $\beta$-tubulin dimers arranged in a
tubular array with an outside diameter of about 25 nm (Fig. 3, right). For more details
see Kandel et al. (2000), Chap. II.4.
Figure 3, left: microtubuli and neurofilaments, the width of the figure corresponds
to approximately 700 nm; right: tubulin dimers, consisting of $\alpha-$ and $\beta$-monomers,
constituting a microtubule.
The tubulins in microtubuli are the substrate which, in Hameroff’s proposal, is used
to embed Penrose’s theoretical framework neurophysiologically. As will be discussed in
more detail in Section 4.5, tubulin states are assumed to depend on quantum events, so
that quantum coherence among different tubulins is possible. Further, a crucial thesis in
the scenario of Penrose and Hameroff is that the (gravitation-induced) collapse of such
coherent tubulin states corresponds to elementary acts of consciousness.
4 Selected Examples
4.1 Ways to Use Quantum Theory
In the following, (some of) the better known and partly worked out approaches that use
concepts of quantum theory for inquiries into the nature of consciousness will be presented
and discussed. For this purpose, the philosophical distinctions $A/B$ (Section 2) and the
neurophysiological distinctions addressed in Section 3 will be used as guidelines to classify
the respective quantum approaches in a systematic way. However, some preliminary
qualifications concerning different possible ways to use quantum theory are in order.
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There are quite a number of accounts discussing quantum theory in relation to con-
sciousness that adopt basic ideas of quantum theory in a purely metaphoncal manner.
Quantum theoretical terms such as entanglement, superposition, collapse, complemen-
tarity, and others are used without specific reference to how they are defined precisely
and how they are applicable to specific situations. For instance, conscious acts are just
postulated to be interpretable somehow analogously to physical acts of measurement, or
correlations in psychological systems are just postulated to be interpretable somehow anal-
ogously to physical entanglement. Such accounts may provide fascinating science fiction,
and they may even be important to inspire nuclei of ideas to be worked out in detail. But
unless such detailed work leads beyond vague metaphors and analogies, they do not yet
represent scientific progress. Approaches falling into this category will not be discussed
in this contribution.
A second category includes approaches that use the status $quo$ of present-day quantum
theory to describe neurophysiological and$/or$ neuropsychological processes. Among these
approaches, the one with the longest history was initiated by von Neumann in the $1930s$ ,
later taken up by Wigner, and currently championed by Stapp. It can be roughly char-
acterized as the proposal to consider intentional conscious acts as intrinsically correlated
with physical state reductions. Another fairly early idea dating back to Ricciardi and
Umezawa in the $1960s$ is to treat mental states, particularly memory states, in terms of
vacuum states of quantum fields. A prominent proponent of this approach at present is
Vitiello. Finally, there is the idea suggested by Beck and Eccles in the $1990s$ , according
to which quantum mechanics is relevant for the description of exocytosis at the synaptic
cleft.
The third category refers to further developments or generalizations of present-day
quantum theory. An obvious candidate in this respect is the proposal by Penrose to
relate elementary conscious acts to gravitation-induced reductions of quantum states.
Ultimately, this requires the framework of a future theory of quantum gravity which
is far from having been developed. Together with Penrose, Hameroff has argued that
microtubuli might be the right place to look for such state reductions. Another set of
approaches is based on generalizations of quantum theory beyond quantum physics proper.
In this way, formally generalized concepts such as complementarity and entanglement can
be applied to phenomena in both mental and material domains. In particular, relations
between the two can be conceived in terms of dual aspects of one underlying reality. This
conception, drawing on the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz, has been considered
attractive by 20th century scientists such as Bohr, Pauli, Bohm, Primas, d’Espagnat, and
others. Some of the proposed scenarios will be sketched.
4.2 Stapp: Quantum State Reductions and Conscious Acts
The act or process of measurement is a crucial aspect in the framework of quantum
theory that has been the subject of controversy for more than seven decades now. In his
monograph on the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics, von Neumann (1955,
Chap. V. 1) introduced, in an $ad$ hoc manner, the projection postulate as a mathematical
tool for describing measurement in terms of a discontinuous, non-causal, instantaneous
and irreversible act given by (1) the transition of a quantum state to an eigenstate $b_{j}$ of
the measured observable $B$ (with a certain probability). This transition is often called
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the collapse or reduction of the wavefunction, as opposed to (2) the continuous, unitary
(reversible) evolution of a system according to the Schr\"odinger equation.
In Chapter VI, von Neumann (1955) discussed the conceptual distinction between
observed and observing system. In this context, he applied (1) and (2) to the general
situation of a measured object system (I), a measuring instrument (II), and (the brain
of) a human observer (III). His conclusion was that it makes no difference for the result
of measurements on (I) whether the boundary between observed and observing system is
posited between I and (II&III) or between (I&II) and III. As a consequence, it is inessential
whether a detector or the human brain is ultimately referred to as the “observer”.7
In contrast to von Neumann’s fairly cautious stance, London and Bauer (1939) went
much further and proposed that it is indeed human consciousness which completes quan-
tum measurement (see Jammer (1974, Sec. 11.3 or Shimony (1963) for a detailed account).
In this way, they attributed a crucial role to consciousness in understanding quantum
measurement–a truly radical position. In the $1960s$ , Wigner (1967) followed up on this
proposal,8 coining his now proverbial example of (Wigner’s friend”. In order to describe
measurement as a real dynamical process generating irreversible facts, Wigner called for
some nonlinear modification of (2) to replace von Neumann’s projection (1)
Since the $1980s$ , Stapp has developed his own point of view on the background of
von Neumann and Wigner. In particular, he tries to understand specific features of
consciousness in relation to quantum theory. Inspired by von Neumann, Stapp uses the
freedom to place the interface between observed and observing system and locates it
in the observer’s brain. He does not suggest any modifications to present-day quantum
theory but adds major interpretational extensions, in particular with respect to a detailed
ontological framework.
In his earlier work, Stapp (1993) starts with Heisenberg’s distinction between the
potential and the actual (Heisenberg 1958), implementing a decisive step beyond the
operational Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg’s notion of
the actual is related to a measured event in the sense of the Copenhagen interpretation.
However, Heisenberg’s notion of the potential, of a tendency, relates to the situation before
measurement, which expresses the idea of a reality independent of measurement. $1$
Immediately after its actualization, each event holds the tendency for the impending
actualization of another, subsequent actual event. Therefore, events are by definition
ambiguous. With respect to their actualized aspect, Stapp’s essential move is to attach
to each Heisenberg actual event an experiential aspect. The latter is called the feel of this
event, and it can be considered to be the aspect of the actual event that gives it its status
as an intrinsic actuality“ (Stapp 1993, p. 149).
7Notice that von Neumann’s chain of observing systems stays always in the material domain. When
he refers to subjective (mental) experiences, he presupposes some psychophysical parallelism allowing him
to treat these experiences as brain processes.
8In his later writings, he repudiated this point of view about the role of consciousness, stating that
“it is outside the realm of quantum mechanics” (Wigner 1977).
9A critical discussion of the problems for Wigner’s approach to measurement, together with the pre-
sentation of alternatives, can be found in Primas (1997).
$1$Margenau $s$ notion of latent observables (Margenau 1950) and d’Espagnat’s notion of an independent
reality (d’Espagnat 1999) are similar ways to achieve such an ontological interpretation of quantum theory.
Another distinction relevant in this context is that of epistemic and ontic descriptions (Atmanspacher
and Primas 2003).
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With respect to their tendency aspect, it is tempting to understand events in terms
of scheme (B) of Sec. 2. This is related to Whitehead’s ontology, in which mental and
physical poles of so-called “actual occasions” are considered as psychological and physical
aspects of reality. The potential antecedents of actual occasions are psychophysically
neutral and refer to a mode of existence at which mind and matter are unseparated.
This is expressed, for instance, by Stapp’s notion of a “hybrid ontology” with “both idea-
like and matter-like qualities” and two complementary modes of evolution (Stapp 1999,
p. 159). Similarities with a dual-aspect approach (B) (cf. Section 4.6) can clearly be
recognized.
In a recent interview (Stapp 2006), Stapp specifies some ontological features of his
approach with respect to Whitehead’s process thinking, where actual occasions rather
than matter or mind are fundamental elements of reality. They are conceived as based
on a processual rather than a substantial ontology. Stapp relates the fundamentally
processual nature of actual occasions to both the physical act of state reduction and the
correlated psychological intentional act.
Another significant aspect of his approach is the possibility that “conscious intentions
of a human being can influence the activities of his brain” (Stapp 1999, p. 153). Different
from the possibly misleading notion of a direct interaction, suggesting an interpretation
in terms of scheme (A) of Sec. 2, he has recently described this feature in a more subtle
manner. The requirement that the mental and material outcomes of an actual occasion
must match, i.e., be correlated, acts as a constraint on the way in which these outcomes
are formed within the actual occasion (cf. Stapp 2006). The notion of interaction is thus
replaced by the notion of a constraint set by mind-matter correlations.
At a level at which conscious mental states and material brain states are distinguished,
each conscious experience, according to Stapp (1999, p. 153), has as its physical coun-
terpart a quantum state reduction actualizing “the pattern of activity that is sometimes
called the neural correlate of that conscious experience”. More precisely, this pattern of
activity may encode an intention and, thus, represent a “template for action”. An inten-
tional decision for an action, preceding the action itself, is then the key for anything like
free will in this picture.
As to the quantum aspect of a template for action, Stapp argues that the mental effort,
i.e. attention devoted to such intentional acts can protract the lifetime of the neuronal
assemblies that represent the templates for action due to quantum Zeno-type effects.
Concerning the neurophysiological implementation of this idea, intentional mental states
are assumed to correspond to reductions of superposition states of neuronal assemblies.
Additional commentary concerning the concepts of attention and intention in relation to
James’ idea of a holistic stream of consciousness (James 1950) is given in Stapp (1999).
For further progress, it will be mandatory to develop a coherent formal framework
for this approach and elaborate on concrete details. For instance, it is not yet worked
out precisely how quantum superpositions and their collapses are supposed to occur in
neural correlates of conscious events. Some indications are outlined in a recent article by
Schwartz et al. (2005). With these desiderata for future work, the overall conception is
conservative insofar as the physical formalism remains unchanged. However, it contains
a radical conceptual move insofar as quantum measurement is understood to involve a
conscious act in addition to a physical process.
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4.3 From Umezawa to Vitiello: Quantum Field Theory
of Mind/Matter States
In the $1960s$ , Ricciardi and Umezawa (1967) suggested to utilize the formalism of quan-
tum field theory to describe brain states, with particular emphasis on memory. The basic
idea is to conceive of memory states in terms of states of many-particle systems as in-
equivalent representations of vacuum states of quantum fields.11 This proposal has gone
through several refinements (e.g., Stuart et al. 1978, 1979; Jibu and Yasue 1995). Major
recent progress has been achieved by including effects of dissipation, chaos, and quantum
noise (Vitiello 1995, Pessa and Vitiello 2003). For readable nontechnical accounts of the
approach in its present form see Vitiello (2001, 2002).
Quantum field theory yields infinitely many representations of the commutation re-
lations, which are inequivalent to the Schrodinger representation of standard quantum
mechanics. Such inequivalent representations can be generated by spontaneous symmetry
breaking, occurring when the ground state (or the vacuum state) of a system is not invari-
ant under the full group of transformations providing the conservation laws for the system.
If symmetry breaks down, collective modes are generated (so-called Nambu-Goldstone bo-
son modes), which propagate over the system and introduce long-range correlations in it.
These correlations are responsible for the emergence of ordered pattems. Unlike in
thermal systems, a large number of bosons can be condensed in an ordered state in a highly
stable fashion. Roughly speaking, this provides a quantum field theoretical derivation of
ordered states in many-body systems described in terms of statistical physics. In the
proposal by Umezawa these dynamically ordered states represent coherent activity in
neuronal assemblies.
The activation of a neuronal assembly is necessary to make the encoded content con-
sciously accessible. This activation is considered to be initiated by external stimuli. Unless
the assembly is activated, its content remains unconscious, unaccessed memory. According
to Umezawa, coherent neuronal assemblies correlated to such memory states are regarded
as vacuum states; their activation leads to excited states with a finite lifetime and enables
a conscious recollection of the content encoded in the vacuum (ground) state. The sta-
bility of such states and the role of external stimuli have been investigated in detail by
Stuart et al. (1978, 1979).
A decisive further step in developing the approach has been achieved by taking dis-
sipation into account. Dissipation is possible when the interaction of a system with its
environment is considered. Vitiello (1995) describes how the system-environment inter-
action causes a doubling of the collective modes of the system in its environment. This
yields infinitely many differently coded vacuum states, offering the possibility of many
memory contents without overprinting. Moreover, dissipation leads to finite lifetimes of
the vacuum states, thus representing temporally limited rather than unlimited memory
(Alfinito and Vitiello 2000, Alfinito et al. 2001). Finally, dissipation generates a genuine
arrow of time for the system, and its interaction with the environment induces entan-
glement. In a recent contribution, Pessa and Vitiello (2003) have addressed additional
effects of chaos and quantum noise.
It should be noted that most presentations of this approach do not consistently dis-
tinguish between mental states and material states. This suggests reducibility of mental
1lRelated proposals based on a similar idea are due to Fr\"ohlich (1968) and Pribram (1971).
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activity to brain activity, within scenario (A) of Sec. 2, as an underlying assumption.
In this sense, Umezawa’s proposal addresses the brain as a many-particle system as a
whole, where the $\iota_{P^{articles}’}$ ’ are more or less neurons. In the language of Section 3.1,
this refers to the level of neuronal assemblies, which has the benefit that this is the level
which directly correlates with mental activity. Another merit of the quantum field theory
approach is that it avoids the restrictions of standard quantum mechanics in a formally
sound way. In these regards, the approach appears to be quite convincing.
Conceptually, however, it contains ambiguities demanding clarification, e,g,, concem-
ing the continuous confusion of mental and material states (and their properties). If
mental states are the primary objects of reference, the quantum field theoretical treat-
ment shows, in a very subtle and refined manner, metaphorical features. If quantum field
theory is supposed to literally apply to material brain states, it remains to be specified
how this is backed up by the results of contemporary neurobiology. Some first steps in this
direction (Freeman and Vitiello 2006) suggest, however, that potential neurobiologically
relevant observables such as electric field amplitudes or neurotransmitter concentration
are purely classical and do not make use of the quantum ideas underlying the theory.
A provocative topic introduced by Vitiello (2001, Sec. 7.7), is the significance of for-
ward and backward arrows of time due to the doubling of collective modes. In his final
chapters, Vitiello (2001) argues that this doubling leads to a “time-reversed copy” of brain
behavior which might be interpreted as its mental counterpart. In his words, “conscious-
ness seems thus to emerge as a manifestation of the dissipative dynamics of the brain”
(Vitiello 2001, p. 141). Such a scenario ascribes comparable significance to material and
mental properties and is evidently non-reductive.
4.4 Beck and Eccles: Quantum Mechanics at the Synaptic Cleft
Probably the most concrete and detailed suggestion of how quantum mechanics can play
a role in brain processes is due to Beck and Eccles (1992), later refined by Beck (2001).
It refers to particular mechanisms of information transfer at the synaptic cleft. However,
ways in which these quantum processes might be relevant for mental activity, and in which
their interactions with mental states are conceived, remain unclarified to the present day.
As presented in Section 3.2, the information flow between neurons in chemical synapses
is initiated by the release of transmitters in the presynaptic terminal. This process is called
exocytosis, and it is triggered by an arriving nerve impulse with some small probability.
In order to describe the trigger mechanism in a statistical way, thermodynamics or quan-
tum mechanics can be invoked. A look at the corresponding energy egimes shows (Beck
and Eccles 1992) that quantum processes are distinguishable $hom$ thermal processes for
energies higher than $10^{-2}eV$ (at room temperature). Assuming a typical length scale for
biological microsites of the order of several nanometers, an effective mass below 10 electron
masses is sufficient to ensure that quantum processes prevail over thermal processes.
The upper limit of the time scale of such processes in the quantum regime is of the
order of $10^{-12}$ sec. This is significantly shorter than the time scale of cellular processes,
which is $10^{-9}\sec$ and longer. The sensible difference between the two time scales makes
it possible to treat the corresponding processes as decoupled from one another.
The detailed trigger mechanism proposed by Beck and Eccles (1992) is based on the
quantum concept of quasi-particles, reflecting the particle aspect of a collective mode.
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Skipping the details of the picture, the proposed trigger mechanism refers to tunneling
processes of twxstate quasi-particles, resulting in state collapses. It yields a probability
of exocytosis in the range between $0$ and 0.7, in agreement with empirical observations.
Using a theoretical framework developed earlier (Marcus 1956, Jortner 1976), the quantum
trigger can be concretely understood in terms of electron transfer between biomolecules.
As indicated above, the proposal outlined so far is the most empirically concrete and
theoretically detailed approach to treating brain processes from a quantum theoretical
point of view. However, the question remains how the quantum trigger for exocytosis
may be relevant for conscious mental states. There are two aspects to this question.
The first one refers to Eccles’ intention to utilize quantum processes in the brain
as an entry point for mental causation. The idea, as indicated in Section 1, is that
the fundamentally indeterministic nature of individual quantum state collapses offers
room for the influence of mental powers on brain states. In the present picture, this is
conceived in such a way that ”mental intention (volition) becomes neurally effective by
momentarily increasing the probability of exocytosis” (Beck and Eccles 1992, p. 11360).
Further justification of this assumption is not given.
The second aspect refers to the problem that processes at single synapses cannot
be simply correlated to mental activity, whose neural correlates are coherent assemblies
of neurons. Most plausibly, prima facie uncorrelated random processes at individual
synapses would result in a stochastic network of neurons (Hepp 1999). Although Beck
(2001) has indicated possibilities (such as quantum stochastic resonance) for achieving
ordered patterns at the level of assemblies from fundamentally random synaptic processes,
this remains an unsolved problem.
With the exception of Eccles’ idea of mental causation, the approach by Beck and
Eccles essentially focuses on brain states and brain dynamics. In his more recent account,
Beck $(2001, p. 109f)$ states explicitly that science cannot, by its very nature, present
any answer to $[$ ... $]$ questions related to the mind. In this sense, a strictly biophysical
approach may open the door to controlled speculation about mind-matter relations, but
more cannot be achieved.
4.5 Penrose and Hameroff: Quantum Gravity and Microtubuli
In the scenario developed by Penrose and neurophysiologically augmented by Hameroff,
quantum theory is claimed to be effective for consciousncss, but this happens in an ex-
tremely sophisticated way. It is argued that elementary acts of consciousness are non-
algorithmic, i.e., non-computable, and they are neurophysiologically realized as gravitation-
induced reductions of coherent superposition states in microtubuli.
Unlike the approaches discussed so far, which are essentially based on (different fea-
tures of) status $quo$ quantum theory, the physical part of the scenario, proposed by Pen-
rose, refers to future developments of quantum theory for a proper understanding of
the physical process underlying quantum state reduction. The grander picture is that
a full-blown theory of quantum gravity is required to ultimately understand quantum
measurement.
This is a far-reaching assumption, and Penrose does not offer a concrete solution to
this problem. However, he gives a number of plausibility arguments which clarify his
own motivations and have in fact inspired others to take his ideas seriously. Penrose’s
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rationale for invoking state reduction is not that the corresponding randomness offers
room for mental causation to become efficacious (although this is not excluded). His
conceptual starting point, at length developed in two books (Penrose 1989, 1994), is that
elementary conscious acts must be non-algorethmic. Phrased differently, the emergence of
a conscious act is a process which cannot be described algorithmically, hence cannot be
computed. His background in this respect has a lot to do with the nature of creativity,
mathematical insight, G\"odel’s incompleteness theorem, and the idea of a Platonic reality
beyond mind and matter.
In contrast to the unitary time evolution of quantum processes \‘a la (2), Penrose
suggests that a valid formulation of quantum state reduction replacing (1) must faithfully
describe an objective physical process that he calls objective reduction. Since present-day
quantum theory does not contain such a picture, he argues that effects not currently
covered by quantum theory should play a role in state reduction. Ideal candidates for
him are gravitational effects since gravitation is the only fundamental interaction which is
not integrated into quantum theory so far. Rather than modifying elements of the theory
of gravitation (i.e., general relativity) to achieve such an integration, Penrose discusses the
reverse: that novel features have to be incorporated in quantum theory for this purpose.
In this way, he arrives at the proposal of gravitation-induced objective state reduction.
Why is such a version of state reduction non-computable? Initially one might think
of an objective version of state reduction in terms of a stochastic process, as most cur-
rent proposals for such mechanisms indeed do. This would certainly be indeterministic,
but probabilistic and stochastic processes can be standardly implemented on a computer,
hence they are definitely computable. Penrose (1994, Secs. 7.8 and 7.10) sketches some
ideas concerning genuinely non-computable, not only random, features of quantum grav-
ity. In order for them to become viable candidates for explaining the non-computability
of gravitation-induced state reduction, a long way still has to be gone.
With respect to the neurophysiological implementation of Penrose’s proposal, his col-
laboration with Hameroff has been crucial. With his background as an anaesthesiologist,
Hameroff suggested to consider microtubules as an option for where reductions of quan-
tum states can take place in an effective way, see $e.g.$ , Hameroff and Penrose (1996). The
respective quantum states are assumed to be coherent superpositions of tubulin states,
ultimately extending over many neurons. Their simultaneous gravitation-induced collapse
is interpreted as an individual elementary act of consciousness. The proposed mechanism
by which such superpositions are established includes a number of involved details that
remain to be conflrmed or disproven.
The idea of focusing on microtubuli is partly motivated by the argument that special
locations are required to ensure that quantum states can live long enough to become
reduced by gravitational influence rather than by interactions with the warm and wet en-
vironment within the brain. Speculative remarks about how the non-computable aspects
of the expected new physics mentioned above could be significant in this scenariol2 are
given in Penrose (1994, Sec. 7.7).
Influential criticism of the possibility that quantum states can in fact survive long
enough in the thermal environment of the brain has been raised by Tegmark (2000). He
12Interestingly, a recent study shows that gravitation seems to be necessary for the development of an
ordered network of microtubuli (Papaseit et al., 2000). But there is no obvious relation between this
result and objective state reduction.
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estimates the decoherence time of tubulin superpositions due to interactions in the brain
to be less than $10^{-12}$ sec. Compared to typical time scales of microtubule processes of the
order of milliseconds and more, he concludes that the lifetime of tubulin superpositions
is much too short to be significant for neurophysiological processes in the microtubuli.
In a response to this criticism, Hagan et al. (2002) have shown that a revised version of
Tegmark’s model provides decoherence times up to 10 to 100 $\mu sec$ , and it has been argued
that this can be extended up to the neurophysiologicaIly relevant range of 10 to 100 msec
under particular assumptions of the scenario by Penrose and Hameroff.
However, decoherence is just one piece in the debate about the overall picture proposed
by Penrose and Hameroff. From a philosophical perspective, their proposal has occasion-
ally received outspoken rejection, see e.g., Grush and Churchland (1995). Indeed, their
approach collects several top level mysteries, among them the relation between mind and
matter itself, the ultimate unification of all physical interactions, the origin of mathemat-
ical truth, and the understanding of brain dynamics across hierarchical levels. Combining
such deep issues is certainly fascinating, but it is as ambitious as it is provocative.
By and large, the scenario by Penrose and Hameroff represents a highly speculative
approach with conceptual problems and without plausible concrete ideas for empirical
confirmation. On the other hand, it is worthwhile to remember Bohr’s bonmot that the
question may not be whether a theory is too crazy but whether it is crazy enough.
4.6 Mind and Matter as Dual Aspects
Dual-aspect approaches consider mental and material domains of reality as aspects, or
manifestations, of one underlying reality in which mind and matter are unseparated. In
such a framework, the distinction between mind and matter results from the application
of a basic tool for achieving epistemic access to, i.e., gather knowledge about, both the
separated domains and the underlying reality.13 Consequently, the status of the under-
lying, psychophysically neutral domain is considered as ontic relative to the mind-matter
distinction.
As mentioned in Section 2, dual-aspect approaches have a long history. As regards
quantum theoretically inspired variations on this theme, interesting versions have been
proposed by Pauli and Jung (Jung and Pauli 1955, Meier 2001; Atmanspacher and Primas
1996, 2006) and by Bohm and Hiley (Bohm 1990, Bohm and Hiley 1993, Hiley 2001).
In the latter approach, the notions of implicate and explicate order mirror the distinc-
tion between ontic and epistemic domains. At the level of the implicate order, the term
active information expresses that this level is capable of “informing” the epistemically dis-
tinguished, explicate domains of mind and matter. At this point it should be emphasized
that the usual notion of information is clearly an epistemic term. Nevertheless, there are
quite a number of dual-aspect approaches addressing something like information at the
ontic, psychophysically neutral level.14
13Emphatically, Spencer-Brown (1969, Chap. 1) proposed such a procedure as the basis of all cognitive
activity: “We take as given the idea of distinction and the idea of indication, and that we cannot make
an indication without drawing a distinction.”
14The pioneering quantum conception of information is von Weizscker’s ur-theory (Weizs\"acker 1985),
most prominent is Wheeler’s “it from bit” (Wheeler 1994), most recent are proposals by Zeilinger (Brukner
and Zeilinger 2003$)$ , Fuchs $($ 2002), and Clifton et al. $($ 2003$)$ . See also Chalmers $($ 1996) for a discussion
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Using an information-like concept in a non-epistemic manner is inconsistent if the
common (syntactic) significance of Shannon-type information is intended, which requires
distinctions in order to construct partitions, providing altematives, in the set of given
events. Most information-based dual-aspect approaches do not sufficiently clarify their
notion of information, so that misunderstandings are almost unavoidable.
While the proposal by Bohm and Hiley essentially sketches a conceptual framework
without further details, particularly concerning the mental domain, the suggestions by
Pauli and Jung offer some more material to discuss. An intuitively appealing way to
represent their approach considers the distinction between epistemic and ontic domains of
matemal reality due to quantum theory in parallel with the distinction between epistemic
and ontic mental domains.
On the physical side, the epistemic/ontic distinction refers to the distinction between
a “local realism” of empirical facts obtained from classical measuring instruments and
a “holistic realism” of entangled systems (Atmanspacher and Primas 2003). Essentially,
these domains are connected by the process of measurement, thus far conceived as inde-
pendent of conscious observers. The corresponding picture on the mental side refers to a
distinction between the conscious and the unconscious.15 In Jung’s depth psychological
conceptions, these two domains are connected by a process of emergence of conscious
mental states from the unconscious, analogous to physical measurement.
In Jung’s depth psychology it is crucial that the unconscious has a collective compo-
nent, unseparated between individuals and consisting of the so-called archetypes. They
are regarded as constituting the psychophysically neutral level covering both the collective
unconscious and the holistic reality of quantum theory. At the same time they operate
as ordering factors, being responsible for the arrangement of their psychical and physical
manifestations in the epistemically distinguished domains of mind and matter. More $dearrow$
tailed illustrations of this picture can be found in Jung and Pauli (1955), Meier (2001),
and Atmanspacher and Primas (1996, 2006).
This scheme is clearly related to scenario (B) of Sec. 2, combining an epistemically
dualistic with an ontically monistic approach. There is a causal relationship (in the sense
of formal rather than efficient causation) between the psychophysically neutral, monistic
level and the epistemically distinguished mental and material domains. In Pauli’s and
Jung’s terms this kind of causation is expressed by the ordering operation of archetypes
in the collective unconscious.
A remarkable feature of scenario (B) is the possibility that the mental and material
manifestations may inherit mutual correlations due to the fact that they are jointly caused
by the psychophysically neutral level. One might say that such correlations are remnants
reflecting the lost holism on this level. In this sense, they are not the result of any direct
causal interaction between mental and material domains. Thus, they are not suitable
for an explanation of direct mental causation in the usual sense. Their existence would
require some unconscious activity entailing correlation effects that would appear as mental
causation. Independently of quantum theory, a related move was suggested by Velmans
(2002). But even without mental causation, scenario (B) is relevant to the ubiquitous
of information-based dual aspects.
15It is obvious that the term ”mental” is used here with a connotation more general than that of con-
sciousness. Preconscious, subconscious, and unconscious domains, personal and collective, are included
as well.
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correlations between conscious mental states and brain states.
In the proposal by Pauli and Jung, these correlations are called synchronistic (see also
Primas 1996), and have been applied to psychosomatic relationships as well (Meier 1975).
An essential condition required for synchronistic correlations is that they are meaningful
for those who experience them. It is tempting to interpret the use of meaning as an
attempt to introduce semantic information as an alternative to syntactic information as
addressed above. Although this entails all kinds of problems concerning a clear-cut defini-
tion and operationalization, something like meaning, both explicitly and implicitly, might
be a relevant informational currency for mind-matter relations (Atmanspacher 1997).
Recently, Primas (2003, 2008) has proposed a dual-aspect approach where the distinc-
tion of mental and material domains originates from the distinction between two different
modes of time: tensed (mental) time, including nowness, on the one hand and tenseless
(physical) time, viewed as an external parameter, on the other (see the entries on time
and on being and becoming in modern physics). These two concepts of time emerge due
to a symmetry breaking of a timeless level of reality that is psychophysically neutral.16
Nowness and the directedness of time originate in the mental domain, whose tensed time
is quantum-correlated with the parameter time of physics via time-entanglement. It must
be admitted that this is still a tentative scheme without concrete indications of how to
confirm or reject it empirically. Nevertheless it is highlighted here since, for the first
time, it offers a formally elaborated and conceptually consistent dual-aspect quantum
framework for basic aspects of the mind-matter problem.
As indicated above, the approaches by Stapp (Section 4.2) and Vitiello (Section 4.3)
contain elements of dual-aspect thinking as well, although these are not much emphasized
by the authors. The dual-aspect quantum approaches discussed in the present section
tend to focus on the issue of entanglement more than on state reduction. The primary
purpose here is to understand correlations between mental and material domains rather
than direct interactions between them. In this respect, it is worthwhile to refer to an
attempt at generalizing the axiomatic basis of standard quantum theory in such a way
that the concept of entanglement becomes applicable even beyond physical examples
(Atmanspacher et al. 2002).
A final critical issue of dual-aspect approaches in general refers to the problem of
panpsychism (see the recent review by Skrbina 2003). In the limit of a universal symmetry
breaking at the psychophysically neutral level, every system has both a mental and a
material aspect. In such a situation it is important to understand “mentality” much more
generally than “consciousness”. Unconscious or prot$\mathfrak{c}\succ$mental acts as opposed to conscious
mental acts are notions sometimes used to underline this difference. The special case of
human consciousness within the mental domain as a whole might be regarded as special
as its material correlate, the brain, within the material domain as a whole.
5 Conclusions
The historical motivation for exploring quantum theory in trying to understand conscious-
ness derived from the realization that collapse-type quantum events introduce an element
16Another proposal (Atmanspacher 2003), based on a similar idea, implements temporal features dif-
ferently.
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of randomness, which is primary (ontic) rather than merely due to ignorance or missing
information (epistemic). Approaches such as those of Wigner, of Stapp, and of Beck and
Eccles emphasize this (in different ways), insofar as the ontic randomness of quantum
events is regarded to provide room for mental causation, i.e., the possibility that con-
scious mental acts can influence brain behavior. The approach by Penrose and Hameroff
also focuses on state collapse, but with a significant move from mental causation to the
non-computability of (particular) conscious acts.
Any discussion of state collapse or state reduction refers, at least implicitly, to entan-
gled states since those are the states that are reduced. In this sense, entanglement is al-
ways co-addressed when state reduction is discussed. By contrast, some of the dual-aspect
quantum approaches utilize the topic of entanglement differently, and independently of
state reduction in the first place. Inspired by the entanglement-induced nonlocal corre-
lations of quantum physics, mind-matter entanglement is conceived as the hypothetical
origin of mind-matter correlations. This reflects the highly speculative picture of a funda-
mentally holistic, psychophysically neutral level of reality from which correlated mental
and material domains emerge.
Each of the examples discussed in this overview has both promising and problematic
aspects. The approach by Beck and Eccles is most detailed and concrete with respect to
the application of standard quantum mechanics to the process of exocytosis. However,
it does not solve the problem of how the activity of single synapses enters the dynamics
of neural assemblies, and it leaves mental causation of quantum processes as a mere
claim. Stapp’s approach suggests a radically expanded ontological basis for both the
mental domain and status-quo quantum theory as a theory of matter without essentially
changing the formalism of quantum theory. Although related to inspiring philosophical
and some psychological background, it still lacks empirical confirmation. The proposal
by Penrose and Hameroff exceeds the domain of present-day quantum theory by far and
is the most speculative example among those discussed. It is not easy to see how the
picture as a whole can be formally worked out and put to empirical test.
The approach initiated by Umezawa is embedded in the framework of quantum field
theory, more broadly applicable and formally more sophisticated than standard quantum
mechanics. It refers directly to the activity of neuronal assemblies as the neural correlates
of mental representations. A clear conceptual distinction between brain states and mental
states is most often missing, although the approach is not intended to be reductionistic.
Vitiello’s more recent accounts offer some clarifying hints in that direction, which point to
an understanding in terms of a dual-aspect approach. Other such approaches, like those
of Pauli and Jung and of Bohm and Hiley, are conceptually more transparent in this
respect. On the other hand, they are essentially unsatisfactory with regard to a sound
formal basis and concrete empirical scenarios. A novel dual-aspect quantum proposal by
Primas, based on the distinction between tensed mental time and tenseless physical time,
marks a significant step forward, particularly as concems a consistent formal framework.
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